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Abstract
In most theories of choice under uncertainty, decision-makers are assumed to eval-
uate acts in terms of subjective values attributed to consequences and probabilities
assigned to events. Case-based decision theory (CBDT), proposed by Gilboa and
Schmeidler, is fundamentally different, and in the tradition of reinforcement learn-
ing models. It has no state space and no concept of probability. An agent evaluates
each available act in terms of the consequences he has experienced through choosing
that act in previous decision problems that he perceives to be similar to his current
problem. Gilboa and Schmeidler present CBDT as a complement to expected util-
ity theory (EUT), applicable only when the state space is unknown. Accordingly,
most experimental tests of CBDT have used problems for which EUT makes no pre-
dictions. In contrast, we test the conjecture that case-based reasoning may also be
used when relevant probabilities can be derived by Bayesian inference from obser-
vations of random processes, and that such reasoning may induce violations of EUT.
Our experiment elicits participants’ valuations of a lottery after observing realisa-
tions of the lottery being valued and realisations of another lottery. Depending on the
treatment, participants know that the payoffs from the two lotteries are independent,
positively correlated, or negatively correlated. We find no evidence of correlation
neglect indicative of case-based reasoning. However, in the negative correlation treat-
ment, valuations cannot be explained by Bayesian reasoning, while stated qualitative
judgements about chances of winning can.
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1 Introduction
Most theories of choice under uncertainty that have been proposed by economists or
decision theorists are closely related to expected utility theory, and often are gener-
alisations of that theory. (For one survey, see Machina and Viscusi 2014, chapters
12-14.) In these theories, uncertainty is represented by a set of states of the world,
any one of which might obtain. Alternative acts available to an agent are represented
as different assignments of consequences to states. Decision-making is conceptu-
alised as a process of evaluating acts in terms of the subjective values that the agent
attributes to their consequences and the probabilities or subjective weights that he or
she assigns to the events in which those consequences occur.
However, case-based decision theory (CBDT), proposed by Gilboa and Schmei-
dler (1995, 2001), is based on a fundamentally different representation of decision
problems. In broad terms, CBDT is in the tradition of psychological theories of rein-
forcement learning (e.g. Bush and Mosteller 1953). In CBDT, there is no state space
and no concept of probability. The agent is not assumed to know anything about
the outside world except what he has actually experienced as the results of previ-
ous decision-making. The agent uses neither forward-looking hypothetical reasoning
(“What will happen if I choose X?”) nor backward-looking counterfactual reason-
ing (“What would have happened if I had chosen X?”). He simply evaluates each
currently available act in terms of the consequences he has in fact experienced as a
result of choosing that act (or in some variants of the theory, choosing similar acts)
in previous decision problems that he perceives to be similar to the problem at hand.
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, pp. 606, 622) present CBDT and expected utility
theory (EUT) as “complementary theories”. They argue that CBDT is normatively
most defensible and descriptively most plausible when “states of the world are neither
naturally given, nor can they be simply formulated”. Decision-making in such cir-
cumstances is decision under ignorance, as contrasted with decision under risk (i.e.,
with known probabilities) and decision under uncertainty (i.e., with known states
of the world but unknown probabilities). For decision under ignorance, Gilboa and
Schmeidler argue, “the very language of expected utility models is inappropriate”. If
this complementarity claim were taken at face value, any idea of testing CBDT and
EUT against one another would be out of place.
Up to now, most experimental tests of CBDT have been designed on the premise
that CBDT and EUT are complementary theories. For example, Ossadnik et al.
(2013) set up an experimental environment of “structural ignorance” (p. 212), and
compare the explanatory power of CBDT with that of three alternative criteria for
decision under ignorance – maximin, maximax, and the pessimism-optimism crite-
rion of Arrow and Hurwicz (1972). Similarly, Grosskopf et al. (2015) start from the
explicit premise that CBDT “is not proposed as an alternative to or a generaliza-
tion of [EUT]” (p. 640), and use an experimental environment in which “EUT is
not a reasonable alternative decision-making procedure” (p. 652). They test CBDT
against the null hypothesis of random choice and against a very simple heuristic,
related to the “Take the Best” algorithm of Gigerenzer and Goldstein (1996). Unlike
Ossadnik et al. and Grosskopf et al., who test specific parameterised forms of CBDT,
Bleichrodt et al. (2017) report experimental tests of predictions derived from a very
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general, non-parameterised version of CBDT. But they too presuppose that CBDT is
intended to be applied to situations in which states cannot be specified (p. 2), and
design their experiment accordingly.1
In contrast, the starting point for our experimental research was the conjecture that
CBDT might have predictive power in situations in which states are well-defined and
objective prior probabilities are known, but expected-utility decision-making requires
the construction of posterior probabilities by Bayesian inference from observations
of random processes. In terms of a distinction introduced by Hertwig et al. (2004),
these are situations in which decisions are made from experience (i.e., the proper-
ties of alternative options must be inferred from previous experience), rather than
from description (i.e., those properties are known a priori). In such situations, the
“correctness” of Bayesian reasoning about probabilities is uncontroversial. Never-
theless, such reasoning can be cognitively demanding and its implications can be
counter-intuitive. It is well-known that human judgements about probability often
contravene Bayesian principles in predictable ways, for example because of the
use of availability and representativeness heuristics (Tversky and Kahneman 1973;
1983). Charness and Levin (2005) report evidence of deviations from Bayesian rea-
soning that are consistent with one of the simplest reinforcement learning rules, the
“win-stay-lose-shift” heuristic. Given that case-based reasoning requires much less
cognitive sophistication and is well-adapted to naturally-occurring problems of deci-
sion under ignorance, the hypothesis that human beings are predisposed to use it is
psychologically plausible and worthy of investigation.
Since our conjecture has not been endorsed by the proposers of CBDT, we cannot
structure our enquiry as a test of that theory. Our methodological strategy is to test
predictions of EUT in situations in which there are intuitive reasons, derived from
the underlying principles of CBDT, for expecting those predictions to fail in specific
ways. This general strategy, used in combination with disparate intuitions, has led to
many important developments in decision theory. The Allais paradox, common ratio
effect, Ellsberg paradox, and preference reversal phenomenon were all first discov-
ered by researchers who recognised potential limitations of EUT but who, at the time
of discovery, were not in a position to propose a comprehensive alternative theory.
These robust violations of EUT achieved the status of “exhibits” which informed the
subsequent development of alternative decision theories.2 These exhibits show non-
random patterns in deviations of actual behaviour from the predictions of EUT. (For
example, the Allais paradox involves comparisons between responses to two binary
choice problems that EUT treats as equivalent. Individuals’ choices are systemati-
cally more risk-averse in one problem than in the other.) Such an exhibit provides
evidence that some non-random mechanism, not encompassed by EUT, is at work,
but is not to be interpreted as confirming any fully-specified alternative theory. Our
1Guilfoos and Pape (2016) report an experimental test of CBDT which uses a very different methodology.
They compare actual behaviour in a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma experiment with simulated data created
by a “software agent” programmed to use case-based reasoning.
2This methodological strategy, and its role in the development of experimental economics, is discussed by
Bardsley et al. (2010, Chapter 4).
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research was designed to have the potential to create exhibits of this kind which might
inform the development and application of CBDT.
Our experiment tests two related intuitions about how case-based reasoning might
lead to systematic deviations from the behaviour predicted by EUT. The first of these
intuitions derives from a fundamental property of CBDT – act separability. In CBDT,
experiences are encoded in memory as cases; each case consists of a problem, the
act that was chosen in that problem, and the result of that choice (measured in util-
ity units). Given a new problem, a decision-maker assesses each available act by
recalling the previous cases in which that act was chosen, and weighting the result of
each of those choices by a measure of the similarity between the problem in which
that choice was made and the new problem. In this algorithm, when any given act
is assessed, the only items of memory that are used are those that record results
that have actually been experienced as a result of the choice of that act. If mem-
ory is used in this way, information that could show positive or negative correlation
between the results of different acts is never retrieved. Thus, one might expect case-
based reasoners to differ from Bayesian reasoners by neglecting information about
correlation.
The second intuition derives from the fact that probability judgements have no
role in CBDT. Case-based reasoning does not lead to the formation of probability
judgements that can be classified as “correct” or “incorrect” according to Bayesian
principles. Instead, by moving directly from memory (encoded without reference
to states or probabilities) to decisions, it circumvents the whole process of forming
probability judgements. When an agent’s case-based reasoning leads to a violation
of EUT, an outside observer may be able to conclude that the agent has behaved as
if she were trying to maximise expected utility but had made erroneous probability
judgements, but the agent herself may have no perception of making or endorsing the
judgments that the observer attributes to her. This raises the possibility that agents
might in fact endorse probability judgements that are systematically different from
those that are revealed in their decisions when those decisions are analysed in the
theoretical framework used by EUT. It is of course debatable whether such a dif-
ference can properly be called a violation of EUT. (Opinions differ about whether
“probability” in EUT refers to an agent’s actual beliefs, or is merely part of a formal
representation of her decision-making behaviour.) But a pattern of predictable differ-
ences between stated and revealed probabilities would be a surprising phenomenon
calling for explanation.
These two lines of investigation have the potential to be mutually corroborating.
Suppose that, in some experiment, participants’ decisions are found to be insensitive
to variations in relevant information about correlation. CBDT would offer a possi-
ble explanation for that observation. However, another possibility might be that the
participants were Bayesian reasoners who had misunderstood the information given
to them, perhaps because of weaknesses in the experimental design. But suppose it
were also found that participants’ stated probabilities showed Bayesian sensitivity to
information about correlation. That would suggest that participants understood that
information, used it when forming probability judgements, but failed to use in when
making decisions. That would give additional credence to CBDT’s explanation of
correlation neglect in decisions.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes act sepa-
rability under CBDT, and Section 3 discusses stated and revealed probabilities under
EUT. Section 4 presents the experimental design; Section 5 discusses the hypotheses,
and Section 6 presents the results. Section 7 concludes with a further discussion.
2 Act separability and correlation neglect
In the core version of CBDT presented by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995), the prim-
itives are problems, acts and results. A problem is interpreted as a description of a
unique decision situation in which the agent faces a non-empty set of acts, one of
which must be chosen. The choice of a particular act in a particular problem leads to
a result. A case is a triple (q, a, r) where q is a problem faced, a is the act chosen
in that problem, and r is the result of that choice. The agent’s memory M is a set
of cases, interpreted as those cases that he has in fact experienced. There is a func-
tion u(·) which assigns a real-valued utility u(r) to every possible result r . A utility
value of zero is interpreted as the agent’s aspiration level, in that if the choice of an
act results in zero utility, that result is treated as giving neutral information, and has
no effect on the evaluation of the act. There is a function s(·, ·) which assigns a real-
valued non-negative similarity coefficient s(p, q) to every ordered pair of problems
(p, q). This coefficient is interpreted as a measure of the similarity of q to p, viewed
from p. The theory is concerned with the behaviour of an agent who faces a new





where the summation over the empty set is treated as having a value of zero.
Now consider how this model deals with a simple case involving assets with
returns that are potentially correlated. Suppose there are two lotteries L1 and L2. The
agent faces a sequence of decision problems; in each problem, he faces one of the
two lotteries and chooses whether or not to play it. Each time he plays either of these
lotteries, the result is either hit, with constant utility uH > 0 or miss, with constant
utility uM < 0. Not betting leads to a utility of zero. If he bets, he immediately learns
whether the outcome was hit or miss. Consider an agent who has faced at least 2n
such prior problems (where n ≥ 1), and has chosen to play each lottery exactly n
times.3 He has experienced h1 hits from L1 and h2 hits from L2. As a final problem,
he faces some lottery Li , i ∈ {1, 2}, and has to choose whether or not to play it.
A natural CBDT representation of this situation (Model 1) would treat “play L1”
as an act a1 and “play L2” as an act a2, with a0 denoting the act of not playing a
lottery. Let Li , i ∈ {1, 2}, denote the set of problems in which lottery Li is offered.
It would also be natural to assume that there is some parameter σ > 0 such that, for
3By assuming that the agent’s memory contains the same number of cases of choosing each lottery, we
avoid the need to distinguish between the core version of CBDT and the “average performance” variant
in which U(a) is a similarity-weighted average (rather than sum) of experienced utilities (Gilboa and
Schmeidler 1995, pp. 619–620).
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i ∈ {1, 2} and for any two problems p, q ∈ Li , s(p, q) = σ , while s(p, q) = 0 for
all other pairs of problems p and q. Then whether the agent chooses to bet in the
final problem is determined by the sign of
U(ai) = σ [hiuH + (n − hi)uM ]
Notice that U(ai) is independent of hj for j = i, and that ∂U(ai)/∂hi = σ(uH −
uM) > 0. Thus, the final choice is determined solely by the number of hits that have
been experienced on whichever lottery is faced in the final problem.
An alternative representation (Model 2) would treat “play some lottery” as a single
act and model the difference between L1 and L2 in terms of a difference in similar-
ity.4 Assume there are parameters σ , σ ′, with σ > 0 and σ ≥ σ ′ ≥ 0, such that for all
problems pi , qi , qj , where i = j , s(pi, qi) = σ and s(pi, qj ) = σ ′. Then whether
the agent chooses to bet in the final problem is determined by the sign of
U(ai) = σ [hiuH + (n − hi)uM ] + σ ′[hjuH + (n − hj )uM ]
For any distinct i and j , ∂U(ai)/∂hi = σ(uH − uM) > 0 and σ(uH − uM) ≥
∂U(ai)/∂hj = σ ′(uH −uM) ≥ 0. Thus, the final choice is potentially determined by
the numbers of hits that have been experienced on both lotteries. Hits on the lottery
that is faced in the final problem have a strictly positive weight that is strictly greater
than the weight for hits on the other lottery; the latter weight may be zero but cannot
be negative.
Notice that, in deriving the conditions under which the agent chooses to bet in
the final problem, we have made no assumptions about correlation between the two
lotteries. In Model 1, the case-based reasoner’s final choice depends only on his expe-
rience of the lottery he is actually facing. This is compatible with Bayesian reasoning
only in the case of a Bayesian agent with a prior belief that the two lotteries are inde-
pendent. In Model 2, the case-based reasoner’s final choice may also be influenced
by his experience of the other lottery, but only in the direction that corresponds with
a Bayesian belief in positive correlation, and only to the extent that the two lotteries
are perceived as subjectively similar. To assume that similarity judgements system-
atically incorporate prior beliefs about correlation would be inconsistent with one of
the fundamental principles of CBDT – that decision-makers use only knowledge that
is derived from direct experience. This thought points to a class of situations in which
the underlying intuitions of CBDT suggest that there might be systematic violations
of EUT. These are situations in which there is a mismatch between salient similar-
ity cues and information about correlation that is not embedded in experiences of
decision-making. Our experimental design attempts to create such situations.
It is already known that people have a tendency to neglect asset correlation, but
the possible connection between this tendency and CBDT has not been explored.
For example, in an asset allocation experiment, Kallir and Sonsino (2009) found that
4Model 2 represents this difference in terms of similarity between problems involving L1 and problems
involving L2. Because these sets of problems are disjoint, this is equivalent to treating “bet on L1” and
“bet on L2” as distinct acts and then, as in the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, pp. 635–638) “alternative
model”, defining similarity as a relationship between (problem, chosen act) pairs.
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participants focused their attention on individual asset returns and that the result-
ing portfolio decisions did not take into account return correlations. Eyster and
Weizsa¨cker (2011) found that even when equipped with correlation information, par-
ticipants regarded assets independently and resorted to the 1/n heuristic (or naı¨ve
diversification) when allocating investment funds to individual securities. Similarly,
in a hypothetical investment choice experiment, Hedesstro¨m et al. (2006) observed
that participants focused on individual asset volatility rather than on portfolio volatil-
ity. Resulting portfolios were inappropriately diversified and had higher volatility.
Correlation neglect has been found to be sensitive to the magnitude of the stakes
involved in the decisions. In portfolio experiments with low stakes, Kroll et al.
(1988) found that while participants were aware of the correlation in stock returns,
correlation information was not reflected in their portfolio choices. However, when
the stakes were significantly increased, participants managed to effectively diversify
their asset holdings and the resulting portfolio choices were closer to the predictions
of mean-variance optimisation. In contrast to the experiments we have just described,
our experiment uses a design that allows us to investigate attitudes to similarity while
controlling and manipulating similarity cues.
3 Stated probabilities and revealed probabilities
EUT legitimates a simple certainty equivalence procedure for eliciting an agent’s
subjective ranking of the probabilities of two events. Fix any two (non-null) events
E1 and E2. Consider consequences that are measured in money units, and assume
that larger consequences are always preferred to smaller ones. Choose any two con-
sequences x and y such that x > y. Let xEiy (i ∈ {1, 2}) denote the act that gives x
if Ei obtains and y otherwise. Given a suitable continuity assumption, EUT implies
that there exist z1, z2 ∈ (x, y) such that the agent has the preferences z1 ∼ xE1y
and z2 ∼ xE2y. (We use ∼ to denote indifference.) Then the subjective probability
of E1 is greater than (equal to, less than) that of E2 if and only if z1 is greater than
(equal to, less than) z2. Variants of this procedure are widely used in experimental
economics to elicit probability judgements.
This procedure is valid for almost all recognised forms of non-expected utility
theory.5 Apart from continuity, to legitimate this procedure a theory must satisfy the
following monotonicity property. Fix any event Ei and any consequences x > z > y
such that z ∼ xEiy. Then for any event Ej , xEjy is strictly preferred to (indifferent
to, strictly less preferred than) z if and only if Ej is more probable than (equally prob-
able as, less probable than) Ei . Many theories of choice under uncertainty have this
property, even those admitting violations of either the independence or transitivity
axioms of EUT.
However, CBDT does not legitimate the certainty equivalence procedure. Since
CBDT explains individuals’ decisions without making any reference to events or
5To say that the procedure is “valid” for a specific theory is to say that the theory includes some concept
of probability ranking and that, if an agent behaves according to the theory, the procedure will correctly
elicit the probability rankings that the theory recognises.
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probabilities, there is no way of using that theory to read off the probabilities of events
from observations of decisions. Indeed, the logic of CBDT suggests that the idea of
trying to infer attitudes to events from decisions is misguided. Notice that, if EUT
holds, we can use any pair of non-indifferent consequences to elicit an agent’s proba-
bility ranking of E1 and E2, and the resulting ranking will be the same. In this sense,
the certainty equivalence procedure elicits attitudes to events that are independent of
the decision problems in which those attitudes are elicited. But this need not be true
for a CBDT agent. For such an agent, indifference between two acts in a particular
decision problem is determined by the agent’s memory of cases that were similar to
that problem; if the problem is changed, the relevantly similar cases can change too.
Once one recognises that there are theories of choice under uncertainty that make
no use of probabilities, it becomes a significant research question to ask whether indi-
viduals’ stated probability judgements are the same as the revealed probabilities that
are elicited by the certainty equivalence procedure. Viewed within the conceptual
framework of EUT, systematic inconsistencies between stated and revealed probabil-
ities would be surprising, and would raise doubts about the construct validity of the
concept of probability used in EUT. There would be particular reason for this kind
of doubt if, in a setting in which correct probabilities could be formed by Bayesian
reasoning, stated probabilities had Bayesian properties but revealed probabilities did
not.
Our experiment is designed to detect instances of correlation neglect that might be
induced by case-based reasoning. Such behaviour, were it to occur, would be picked
up as non-Bayesian properties of revealed probabilities. As an additional diagnostic
tool, we investigate the extent to which revealed probabilities are consistent with
stated probabilities.
In experimental economics, it is standard practice to incentivise survey questions
by reformulating them as decision problems with material (usually monetary) conse-
quences. In the present case, however, the whole point of the enquiry is to discover
whether stated probabilities differ from those that are revealed in decision problems.
We believe that this is one of the class of “significant problems in economics that
appear to be capable of experimental investigation only in nonincentivised designs”
identified by Bardsley et al. (2010, pp. 336–337). The logic of our investigation
requires that the elicitation of stated probabilities is not incentivised.
4 Experimental design
Our experiment used a set-up similar to that analysed in Section 2. In designing
the experimental interface,6 we tried to set a level playing field for investigating the
prevalence of Bayesian and case-based reasoning. We avoided all explicit references
to probability. Information about probability was always conveyed by describing
physical randomising devices, but these descriptions were designed to make the trans-
lation between physical properties and objective probabilities as simple as possible.
6The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007).
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Judgements about the “chances” of a winning outcome were elicited on a qualitative
scale. Thus, participants were not primed to think about probability, but no obstacles
were placed in the way of participants who were predisposed to think in this way.
The two lotteries seen by any participant were displayed and described in exactly
the same way, except for two differentiating features – colour (blue or yellow) and
position (left or right on the participant’s computer screen). Our background assump-
tion was that, for participants who used Bayesian reasoning, it would be obvious that
colour and position provided no information about probabilities or payoffs. However,
by making these irrelevant features visually salient, we made it more likely that par-
ticipants who used case-based reasoning would treat the two lotteries as distinct acts
when encoding results in memory.
Each participant was informed about two lotteries, described as the blue game
board and the yellow game board. Within an experimental session, the boards were
the same for all participants. At appropriate times, these boards were displayed on
participants’ screens, vibrantly coloured in blue or yellow. The blue board always
appeared on the left side of the participant’s screen and the yellow board always
appeared on the right. Each game board had 100 numbered boxes, corresponding with
different numbered balls that might be drawn from a bingo cage (the same cage for
both boards). Each box on each board had a predetermined value of either GBP 20
(a winning box) or zero (a losing box), but this value was not visible to participants
until the box was “opened.” At the start of the session, all boxes were closed.
The experiment had two parts. In Part 1, each participant played ten sample
rounds, five using the blue board and five using the yellow board, in random order.
These were described as “samples that will give you the opportunity to learn as much
as you can about the game boards.” In each sample round, the relevant game board
was displayed on participants’ screens. One ball was drawn from the bingo cage,
without replacement. The corresponding box on the board was opened to show its
value, with a green background if it was a winning box and a red background if it
was a losing box. It remained open only until the end of the round. In this way, each
participant learned the values of five of the 100 boxes on each board, selected at
random subject to the constraint that all ten opened boxes would have different num-
bers. Because no more than one box was open at any time, participants could access
the information revealed in the sample rounds only by attending to each round as it
occurred and by memorising its outcome. This design feature ensured that partici-
pants accumulated memory through experience over time, as is usually assumed in
interpretations of CBDT. Although the sample rounds were not decision problems in
the strict sense of CBDT, the framing was designed to encourage participants to think
of each round as a demonstration of what they might in fact experience, were they to
choose to play the relevant game board. At the end of Part 1, all balls were returned
to the bingo cage.7
7When offering “motivating examples” for CBDT, Gilboa and Schmeidler (2001, pp. 29-34) allow an
agent’s memory to include cases that were not decision problems for her. In one such example, the agent
is an employer choosing between candidates for a job; experiences by previous employers, as reported in
reference letters, are treated as cases.
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In Part 2, each participant faced a valuation task relating to one of the two game
boards, selected at random, independently for each participant. She was told that she
had the opportunity to play this board – that is, to receive the value of one box on that
board, determined by one draw from the bingo cage. The mechanism of Becker et al.
(1964) was used to elicit the minimum amount of money that each participant was
willing to accept in return for giving up this opportunity. Each participant considered
thirty-five possible offer prices, ranging from GBP 0.20 to GBP 20, and reported
whether she was willing to accept each price. In effect, each participant faced thirty-
five binary choice problems, each involving a choice between playing the game board
and receiving some amount of money with certainty. No feedback on the outcome
of any of these choices was provided until the end of the experiment, when one
of the offer prices (selected at random) was revealed as the actual offer price, and
participants’ decisions conditional on that price were implemented. Irrespective of
whether she had chosen to keep or sell the opportunity to play, each participant saw
an independent draw (with replacement) from the bingo cage. This determined the
number of one box on her board, which was then opened. If she had chosen to keep
the opportunity, she was paid the value of this box; if not, she was paid the offer
price. All participants received an additional participation fee of GBP 2.
Notice that the valuation task is an instance of the certainty equivalence proce-
dure, as described in Section 3. Thus, if participants behaved according to EUT (or,
indeed, according to any of a wide class of non-expected utility theories), the reported
valuation of any given participant would be an increasing function of the subjective
probability she assigned to winning the final lottery.
At the start of each sample round in Part 1, and also immediately before the elic-
itation task in Part 2, each participant reported her judgement about “the chance that
this game board [i.e., the board relevant for that round or task] will reveal a winning
box in this round” on a ten-point Likert scale with end-points labelled “very low” and
“very high”. These judgement tasks were not incentivised.
We used a between-subjects design with three treatments, implementing differ-
ent properties of correlation between the lotteries. Each session was pre-assigned to
one of the three treatments. The differences between treatments can be described in
terms of the proportions πB and πY of winning boxes on the final game board on
the blue and yellow boards respectively. In each treatment, the values of πB and πY
were determined by a random draw from a joint distribution of (πB, πY ). Participants
were fully informed about the prior distribution, but were not informed about the
actual draw. Thus, they were given sufficient information to construct objective prior
probabilities of winning on each board, which could then be updated by Bayesian
inference in light of the outcomes of the sample rounds. The method by which this
information was communicated to participants is explained in Appendix A.
In all three treatments, and in all realisations of the random mechanism, each
board was assigned either ten or thirty winning boxes. We refer to a game board with
thirty winning boxes as being a high type board (type H ), and a game board with
ten winning boxes as a low type board (type L). Ex ante, a given board was equally
likely to be of the high or low type, and therefore the ex ante chance of a given box
on the board being a winning box was 0.2. Thus, colours and box numbers had no
information content in themselves.
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The treatments differed in the joint probability distribution used to assign the types
to the two boards.
• In the independent treatment, the types of the boards were drawn independently.
• In the positive correlation treatment, either both boards were type H , or both
boards were type L. Each possibility was equally likely.
• In the negative correlation treatment, one board was always of type H and the
other of type L. It was equally likely that the blue board was type H and the
yellow type L, or vice versa.
For a fully rational Bayesian reasoner, all relevant information about correlation is
contained in the initial joint distribution of board types. However, the assignment of
winning boxes to boards had certain additional features, designed to help participants
to understand the correlation properties of each treatment.
In the positive correlation treatment, the winning numbers were the same for both
boards. For example, consider a participant who observes a win on box 36 of the blue
board in a sample round of the positive treatment. By abstract Bayesian reasoning
from the knowledge that there is perfect positive correlation between πB and πY , she
can deduce that the observed win is just as informative about the probability of win-
ning on the yellow board as it is about the probability of winning on the blue board.
But our design allows her to make a more direct and more concrete inference, from
the knowledge that box 36 on the blue board is a winning box to the conclusion that
box 36 on the yellow board is a winning box. In the negative correlation treatment,
the winning numbers were different for the two boards. Thus, from the knowledge
that box 36 on the blue board was a winning box, a participant could infer that box 36
on the yellow board was a losing box. In the independent treatment, the assignments
of winning numbers to the two boards were independent of one another.
As a further aid to understanding, each sample round ended with a screen,
described as “summaris[ing] what you learned about the game boards in that round.”
On this screen, participants saw the game board they had just played, with the box
just opened coloured green or red and showing “GBP 20” or “GBP 0.” At the bot-
tom of the board there was a message reinforcing this information. On the other side
of the screen there was a message about the corresponding box on the other game
board. For example, consider a round involving the blue game board. Suppose the
announced box number was 4 and its value was GBP 20. Then (irrespective of the
treatment) the message on the blue game board would be “4 is a winning box on the
blue game board.” In the positive correlation treatment, the message on the other side
of the screen would be “4 is a winning box on the yellow game board.” In the nega-
tive correlation treatment, it would be “4 is a losing box on the yellow game board.”
In the independent treatment, it would be “4 may be a winning box or may be a los-
ing box on the yellow game board.” Throughout Part 1, the computer screen also
displayed a header that constantly reminded participants of the correlation between
the two game boards.
Full instructions for the experiment, including examples of screenshots, are given
in an Online Appendix.
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5 Hypotheses
Let i index the game board offered to the participant in Part 2, and j denote the
other game board. Therefore, i, j ∈ {blue, yellow}, with i = j . Let hi denote the
number of winning boxes observed among draws from board i in Part 1, and hj the
number of winning boxes observed among draws from board j in Part 1. We refer to
the pair (hi, hj ) observed by a participant as their memory. The values of hi and hj
are sufficient to compute the Bayesian posterior probability that board i is type H ,
which we denote ρi(hi, hj ). Table 1 presents these posteriors for each treatment, for
the memories realised in our data.8
For a given participant, EUT predicts that the stated valuation of a game board
will be increasing in the posterior. However, because participants may vary in terms
of risk attitudes, this relationship need not be linear, nor the same for all partici-
pants. Furthermore, it is unreasonable to expect participants to assess posteriors in a
numerically precise way. Therefore, for each treatment I (independent), P (positive
correlation), and N (negative correlation), we define corresponding reflexive, com-
plete, and transitive orderings EI , EP , and EN over memories which are based on
the qualitative properties of the Bayesian posterior. For any two memories (hi, hj )
and (h′i , h′j ) we define these orderings as follows:
• In the independent treatment, the posterior is determined entirely by the number
of winning boxes hi observed on board i. We therefore define EI by
(hi, hj )EI (h′i , h′j ) ⇐⇒ hi ≥ h′i .
• In the positive correlation treatment, the posterior is determined entirely by the
total number of winning boxes hi + hj observed, irrespective of board. We
therefore define EP by
(hi, hj )EP (h′i , h′j ) ⇐⇒ hi + hj ≥ h′i + h′j .
• In the negative correlation treatment, the posterior is increasing in the number
of winning boxes observed on board i, and decreasing in the number of win-
ning boxes observed on board j . The difference of the number of winning boxes
between the boards, hi − hj , is not alone sufficient to determine the posterior.
However, among memories for which hi − hj = m for some m, the poste-
rior varies by only a small amount, compared to the variability of the posterior
between two memories for which hi − hj = h′i − h′j . We therefore define the
ordering EN based on the difference hi − hj ,
(hi, hj )EN(h′i , h′j ) ⇐⇒ hi − hj ≥ h′i − h′j .
We derive relations of strict ordering 
E and equivalence ∼E from E in the usual
way.
The ranking of a memory is therefore determined by a treatment-specific sum-
mary statistic, which we write MI(hi, hj ) = hi for the independent treatment;
8See Appendix B for notes on calculating these.
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Table 1 Bayesian posterior
probabilities ρi(hi , hj ) as a
function of the memory (hi , hj ),
for each treatment
(a) Independent
ρ i (h i , h j ) h j = 0 h j = 1 h j = 2
h i = 0 .216 .216 .216
h i = 1 .518 .518 .518
h i = 2 .818 .818 .818
(b) Positive correlation
ρ i (h i , h j ) h j = 0 h j = 1 h j = 2
h i = 0 .065 .216 .541
h i = 1 .216 .541 .844
h i = 2 .541 .844 .965
(c) Negative correlation
ρ i (h i , h j ) h j = 0 h j = 1 h j = 2 h j = 3
h i = 0 .500 .201 .056 .013
h i = 1 .799 .500 .190 .050
h i = 2 .944 .810 .500 .178
h i = 3 .987 .952 .822 .500
MP (hi, hj ) = hi + hj for the positive correlation treatment; and MN(hi, hj ) =
hi − hj for the negative correlation treatment. The summary statistic Mt (for t ∈
{I, P,N}) therefore represents the ordering Et .
The experimental design assigns each participant at random to a memory (hi, hj )
determined by the randomly-selected sample box numbers and the game board
offered. Each participant k reports a valuation, which we denote vk(hi, hj ). Under
EUT, and indeed any decision theory in which valuations are monotonic in the
Bayesian posterior, valuations will increase in the summary statistic. The following
hypothesis is therefore an implication of EUT.
Hypothesis 1 For each treatment t , the reported valuations are increasing in Mt ,
the summary statistic of the memory.
Our interest is in whether actual behaviour deviates from EUT in directions that
would be indicative of case-based reasoning. Our design is based on the working
assumption that, in all three treatments, participants perceive plays on boards of the
same colour as more similar to one another than to plays on boards whose colours
are different. Given this assumption, the underlying principles of CBDT suggest the
following case-based weighting conjecture: when participants report valuations of
the offered board i, they give greater weight to winning boxes observed on that board
than to winning boxes observed on board j . (Wins on board j might be given zero
weight, as in Model 1 of Section 2, or positive but lower weight than wins on board
j , as in Model 2.) Following the methodological strategy of looking for exhibits (see
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Section 1), we focus on cases in which this conjecture implies unambiguous biases
in behaviour relative to EUT predictions. Such biases are implied only in the positive
and negative correlation treatments.
We formalise the case-based weighting conjecture by defining an alternative
ranking of memories in the positive correlation and negative correlation treatments.
• In the positive correlation treatment, fix some m ∈ Z+ and consider the set of
memories {(hi, hj ) : hi + hj = m}. This set is an indifference class of the
ordering EP . The case-based weighting conjecture implies a strict ranking 
CP
of the members of this set,
(hi, hj )
CP (h′i , h′j ) ⇐⇒ hi + hj = h′i + h′j = m and hi > h′i . (1)
• In the negative correlation treatment, fix some m ∈ Z and consider the set of
memories {(hi, hj ) : hi − hj = m}. This set is an indifference class of the
ordering EN . The case-based weighting conjecture implies a strict ranking 
CN
of the members of this set,
(hi, hj )
CN(h′i , h′j ) ⇐⇒ hi − hj = h′i − h′j = m and hi > h′i . (2)
The following hypothesis is an implication of the case-based weighting conjecture:
Hypothesis 2 For a given treatment t ∈ {P,N}, consider any set of memories
{(hi, hj ) : Mt(hi, hj ) = m} for some m. Within this set, reported valuations are
increasing in hi , the number of winning boxes observed on the offered board.
Recall that each participant reported judgements about the “chance” of seeing a
winning number prior to each box being opened, both in Part 1 and Part 2. To allow
meaningful comparisons across participants, we normalise each participant’s use of
the Likert scale relative to that participant’s judgement of the chance of winning on
the first Part 1 game board. At the stage of the experiment at which this first judge-
ment was reported, all participants had the same information, and that information
implied that the objective probability of seeing a winning box was 0.2. For each par-
ticipant, we define the variable expectation difference, which takes on the value +1
when the participant reports a higher chance in Part 2 than at the start of Part 1; −1
when the participant reports a lower chance in Part 2 than at the start of Part 1; and 0
when the chances reported in Part 2 and at the start of Part 1 are the same. Expectation
difference can be interpreted as a self-reported judgement about whether the proba-
bility of seeing a winning box on the relevant board i, given the participant’s memory
(hi, hj ), is greater than, less than, or equal to 0.2. Thus, if stated probabilities are
consistent with Bayesian reasoning, the following hypothesis will hold:
Hypothesis 3 For each treatment t , the reported expectation differences are increas-
ing in Mt , the summary statistic of the memory.
Because CBDT makes no reference to probability, it does not support any
particular conjecture about stated probabilities.
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6 Results
We conducted a total of thirty sessions in March 2014; there were ten sessions for
each treatment. Each session had six to eight participants and lasted 45 minutes.
Average earnings were GBP 8.40, and ranged from GBP 2.00 to GBP 22.00. All
226 participants (119 male, 107 female) were recruited from the standing participant
pool recruited by the Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science at the
University of East Anglia, managed via ORSEE (Greiner 2015).
The experimental design assigned participants randomly to experimental sessions,
and therefore to treatments. Furthermore, because the sample results from the game
boards were themselves determined at random, the design randomly assigned par-
ticipants to realised memories (hi, hj ). Therefore, the data of any pair of memories
(hi, hj ) = (h′i , h′j ) are independent samples.
Our hypotheses make predictions about how valuations and expectation differ-
ences change as a function of the observed memory. We base our statistical analysis
on nonparametric tests using rank orders. These tests are well-suited to our hypothe-
ses in that our hypotheses only concern trends in valuations as function of hi and hj .
In addition, because our design uses a discrete and predetermined set of questions to
elicit valuations, we obtain only a bracketing interval around each participant’s valu-
ation. These intervals are non-overlapping and are therefore ranked from high to low,
which is sufficient for the rank order approach.
Our choice architecture did not require participants to give a monotonic response
to the questions implementing the Becker et al. procedure. Participants could indi-
cate simultaneously that they accepted some price while rejecting a strictly higher
price. Of the 226 participants, 210 provided monotonic responses to the valuation
questions. In addition, 4 participants gave responses which were monotonic with the
exception of one isolated price, such that, if the response to that price were inverted,
the resulting schedule is monotonic. We neglect the isolated non-monotonic response
for those 4 participants and include them in our analysis. We drop the remaining 12
participants. For each of the 214 participants in our sample so defined, we define
their valuation as the lowest accepted price. 9
Table 2 summarises the data on stated valuations. For each treatment and mem-
ory, we report the median valuation, as well as the first and third quartiles. We group
memories for each treatment t according to Et , and provide the expected payoff of a
single play of board i given the posterior. We note that this expected payoff is lower
than the median stated valuation for most memories. This tendency to overvalue a
gamble with low probability of winning a large amount is observed, for example,
in preference-reversal experiments such as Seidl (2002), and overweighting of small
probabilities of gains is a central feature of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tver-
sky 1979). In the independent and positive treatments, median valuations generally
increase in the posterior probability; the median valuation is roughly 100 pence above
the expected payoff. In contrast, in the negative treatment valuations do not appear
9More precisely, the revealed valuation falls within the interval between the highest rejected price and
lowest accepted price. We identify each interval by its upper endpoint for conciseness.
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Table 2 Summary data for valuations by treatment
(a) Independent
Posterior .216 .518 .818
RNEUT 286 407 527
(hi j ) = (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1)
N 8 7 8 8 14 11 8 11
Quartile 1 150 300 270 300 300 260 450 500
Median 260 400 475 425 500 400 675 600
Quartile 3 650 800 750 850 750 500 800 800
(b) Positive treatment
Posterior .065 .216 .541 .844 .965
RNEUT 226 286 416 536 586
(hi j ) = (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (0,2) (1,1) (2,0) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2)
N 7 15 13 4 7 4 8 6 8
Quartile 1 200 200 260 475 350 675 525 450 550
Median 220 350 400 500 500 725 650 525 650
Quartile 3 500 700 500 650 750 1375 1000 800 900
(c) Negative treatment
Posterior .013 .056 .190 .201 .500 .799 .810 .944 .987




, hj ) = (0,3) (0,2) (1,2) (0,1) (1,1) (2,2) (1,0) (2,1) (2,0) (3,0)
N 2 9 3 9 7 7 11 4 11 4
Quartile 1 280 400 100 200 500 400 300 550 350 450
Median 490 600 500 450 750 550 500 700 500 500
Quartile 3 700 750 500 600 1200 1100 750 900 800 600
N is the number of participants to observe each memory. Posterior refers to the Bayesian posterior, given
the memory, that the offered board i is of the high type, and RNEUT gives the expected payoff of a single
play of board i given the posterior. All values given in pence
to vary systematically as a function of the posterior. For example, given the memory
(hi, hj ) = (2, 0), the expected payoff to a play of board i is 578 pence, contrasting
with an expected payoff of 223 given the memory (hi, hj ) = (0, 2). However, the
median valuation in (2, 0) is actually lower than that in (0, 2).
To give a more complete picture of how the distribution of valuations changes as
a function of the memory, we provide measurements of effect sizes for each pair of
memories within a treatment. Consider two memories (hi, hj ) and (h′i , h′j ), and let v
be a randomly-chosen valuation observed at (hi, hj ) and v′ a randomly-chosen valu-
ation observed at (h′i , h′j ). The effect size is computed as Pr(v > v′)+ 12Pr(v = v′).
These are reported in Table 3, in which each cell is the probability that a val-
uation drawn from the row memory is greater than a valuation drawn from the
column memory. This effect size is directly related to the test statistic used in the
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Table 3 Effect sizes for comparisons of valuations, pairwise by outcome of sample draws
(a) Independent
Posterior .216 .518 .818
(hi j ) (0,0) (0,1) (0,2) (1,0) (1,1) (1,2) (2,0) (2,1)
N 8 7 8 8 14 11 8 11
(0,0) 8 — .29 .33 .35 .34 .44 .30 .26*
(0,1) 7 — .56 .47 .45 .62 .38 .32







Posterior .065 .216 .541 .844 .965
(hi j ) (0,0) (0,1) (1,0) (0,2) (1,1) (2,0) (1,2) (2,1) (2,2)
N 7 15 13 4 7 4 8 6 8
(0,0) 7 — .47 .33 .21 .32 .11** .13** .30 .13**
(0,1) 15 — .46 .32 .39 .18** .24** .36 .26*












, hj ) (0,3) (0,2) (1,2) (0,1) (1,1) (2,2) (1,0) (2,1) (2,0) (3,0)
N 2 9 3 9 7 7 11 4 11 4
(0,3) 2 — .33 .67 .58 .21 .43 .45 .25 .32 .44
(0,2) 9 — .74 .70 .38 .51 .59 .33 .53 .60








Each cell is the probability that a randomly-selected valuation reported given the memory in the row is
greater than a randomly-selected valuation reported given the memory in the column. Asterisks indicate
significance of the difference using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; * at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
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Table 4 Test for increasing valuations as a function of the summary statistic
Comparison Independent Positive Negative
M = −3 vs M = −2 .38
M = −2 vs M = −1 .62*
M = −1 vs M = 0 .42
M = 0 vs M = 1 .47 .40 .50
M = 1 vs M = 2 .33** .30** .39
M = 2 vs M = 3 .46 .66
M = 3 vs M = 4 .44
Cuzick p .049 < .001 .58
Each row reports the effect size of the pairwise comparison of valuations given two summary statistics.
Asterisks indicate significance of the pairwise difference using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; * at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon (MWW) test for equality of distributions. As a conve-
nience, we indicate in Table 3 the pairs of memories for which the effect size is
statistically different from one-half using the MWW test.
Because memories are sorted in order of the posterior probability that board i
is a high-type board, it would be expected under EUT to see effect sizes less than
one-half towards the top-right of the matrix. This pattern is observed broadly in the
independent and positive correlation treatments. However, no clear pattern emerges
in the negative correlation treatment.
The MWW test is suitable for comparing the distributions of valuations in two
groups. In some circumstances, our hypotheses require comparing across three or
more groups. For this purpose we adopt the test for trend of Cuzick (1985). This
test extends the rank-order calculation of the MWW test to three or more groups; for
two groups Cuzick’s test coincides with MWW exactly. This test requires ordering
the groups being compared. The null hypothesis is there is no trend (increasing or
decreasing) in the data across the groups, against the alternative hypothesis of a trend.
Result 1 In the independent and positive correlation treatments, valuations are
increasing as a function of the summary statistic Mt(hi, hj ) of the memory. In the
negative correlation treatment, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no trend.
Support. Table 4 reports an aggregation of the pairwise comparisons as shown in
Table 3, where pairwise comparisons are made after grouping valuations by the
corresponding summary statistic of the memory. If valuations are increasing in the
summary statistic, effect sizes below .5 are expected. This is observed in the pairwise
comparisons under the independent and positive correlation treatments. Cuzick’s
test confirms the trend is significant (p = .049 for the independent treatment and
p < .001 for the positive correlation treatment). In contrast, the direction of the pair-
wise comparisons is mixed for the negative correlation treatment, with two of the
six pairwise comparisons going in the opposite direction. The null hypothesis of no
systematic trend cannot be rejected (p = .58).
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Table 5 Test for trends predicted by the similarity conditional on the summary statistic of a memory
Pairwise effect size
Conditional on hi = 0 vs. hi = 1 hi = 1 vs. hi = 2 Cuzick p
(a) Positive treatment
hi + hj = 1 .46 .75
hi + hj = 2 .59 .20 .20
hi + hj = 3 .66 .33
Combined .33
(b) Negative treatment
hi − hj = −1 .54 .85
hi − hj = 0 .42 .61
hi − hj = 1 .71 .24
Combined .41
The pairwise effect sizes are for comparisons as reported in Table 3. The p-value for each conditional
test for trend is reported in each row. The overall p-value reported is calculated using Fisher’s combined
method
Result 2 There is no significant evidence of the systematic deviations from EUT
implied by the case-based weighting conjecture.
Support. Hypothesis 2 proposes that, in the positive and negative correlation treat-
ments and conditional on a realised value m for the summary statistic, valuations
will be increasing in the number hi of winning boxes observed on the offered board.
Conditional on a value of m, we conduct Cuzick’s test for trend in hi , and report
the results in Table 5. Each row corresponds to one conditional test. For each row,
we repeat the pairwise effect sizes drawn from Table 3. If an increasing trend in hi
were present, we would expect effect sizes in excess of .5. No individual pairwise
comparison, nor any conditional test for trend, is significant. Because of the random
assignment of participants to memories, each of the conditional tests is independent
of the others, and therefore we can combine the results of the conditional tests into
a grand test using Fisher’s combined probability method. We cannot reject the null
hypothesis of no trend overall (p = .33 for positive correlation and p = .41 for
negative correlation).
We now turn to the data on stated judgements. Table 6 shows, for each Bayesian
posterior, the breakdown of expectation differences across participants. Overall there
is a general trend of decreased optimism, in that around half of the participants report
a less optimistic judgement prior to Part 2 than at the start of Part 1. Given that the
initial probability of seeing a winning box was only 0.2, the direction of this trend
is consistent with the known tendency for rare events to be given greater weight
when decisions are made from description – that is, on the basis of a priori infor-
mation about the properties of random mechanisms – than when they are made from
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Table 6 Expectation difference, as a function of posterior
ρi(hi , hj ) Decrease No change Increase Total
(a) Independent
.216 15 7 2 24
.518 23 9 2 34
.818 8 4 7 19
Total 46 20 11 77
(b) Positive correlation
.065 6 1 1 8
.216 17 8 4 29
.541 9 5 1 15
.844 7 4 4 15
.965 2 4 2 8
Total 41 22 12 75
(c) Negative correlation
.013 2 1 0 3
.056 7 1 3 11
.190 2 0 1 3
.201 5 4 2 11
.500 8 5 2 15
.799 7 1 4 12
.810 0 2 2 4
.944 3 3 5 11
.987 1 1 2 4
Total 35 18 21 74
experience – on the basis of trial-by-trial experience of the realisations of random
mechanisms (Hertwig et al. 2004). In our experiment, judgements about the first Part
1 game board could be made only from description, while judgements about the Part
2 board could take account of both description and experience.
Table 7 presents effect size comparisons on the judgements data. Because we code
only the sign of the change in reported judgement from the first period to the last,
our measure of judgement is coarse. We therefore aggregate judgements by the level
sets ∼E given by EUT. All treatments show a general pattern of small effect sizes in
the upper-right of the table, which indicates a broad consistency of judgements with
Bayesian posteriors.
Result 3 In all treatments, judgements are more optimistic, as measured by expecta-
tion differences, when the Bayesian posterior probability is higher.
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Table 7 Effect sizes for
comparisons of judgements,
pairwise by outcome of sample
draws
(a) Independent
hi 0 1 2
N 24 34 19
0 24 — .53 .35*
1 34 — .33**
2 19 —
(b) Positive correlation
hi + hj 0 1 2 3 4
N 8 29 15 15 8
0 8 — .43 .44 .36 .27*
1 29 — .52 .42 .33
2 15 — .40 .30*
3 15 — .43
—84
(c) Negative correlation
hi − hj -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3
N 3 11 14 15 16 11 4
-3 3 — .44 .38 .41 .32 .23 .21
-2 11 — .46 .49 .41 .33 .32
-1 14 — .53 .44 .35 .33




Each cell is the probability that
a randomly-selected judgement
reported after the outcome in the
row is greater than a randomly-
selected judgement reported
after the outcome in the column.
Asterisks indicate significance
of the difference using the
Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; *
at 10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
Support We follow the same approach as in Result 1, using the expectation differ-
ences in place of valuations. The details for Cuzick’s test for trend are summarised
in Table 8. If judgements are more optimistic when the Bayesian posterior is higher,
then we expect effect sizes to be less than .5. This is generally the case for all three
treatments. Notably, for the negative correlation treatment, this contrasts sharply with
the data for the corresponding Result 1 test in Table 4. We reject the null hypothe-
sis of no trend for all treatments, (p = .084 for independent, p = .048 for positive
correlation, and p = .030 for negative correlation).
Our data therefore show a contrast between the patterns in participants’ valuations
and the patterns in their expectation differences in the negative treatment. Table 2
suggests stated valuations remain high in the negative treatment even when the
Bayesian posterior gives a low chance the offered board is of the high type, and
Result 1 formalises this statement. However, Result 3 shows expectation differences
are more optimistic in situations in which the Bayesian posterior advises they should
indeed be more optimistic.
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Table 8 Test for increasing judgements as a function of the summary statistic
Comparison Independent Positive Negative
M = −3 vs M = −2 .44
M = −2 vs M = −1 .46
M = −1 vs M = 0 .53
M = 0 vs M = 1 .53 .43 .40
M = 1 vs M = 2 .33** .52 .43
M = 2 vs M = 3 .40 .48
M = 3 vs M = 4 .43
Cuzick p .084 .048 .030
Each row reports the effect size of the pairwise comparison of judgements given two summary statistics.
Asterisks indicate significance of the pairwise difference using the Mann-Whitney-Wilcoxon test; * at
10%, ** at 5%, *** at 1%
7 Discussion and conclusions
Our experiment was motivated by the conjecture that human decision-makers have a
tendency to use case-based reasoning even when events are well-defined and when
the objective probabilities of those events can be found by Bayesian reasoning from
prior information. More specifically, we tested the “case-based weighting conjecture”
that systematic violations of EUT occur when information about correlation is not
embedded in experienced decision outcomes and when Bayesian reasoning involves
inferences between lotteries that are saliently dissimilar. We designed the experiment
in the belief that this conjecture was consistent with the psychological intuitions of
CBDT. Had the evidence confirmed that conjecture, we would have interpreted our
results as providing support for CBDT. In fact, we found no significant evidence of
the effects implied by the conjecture. If we are right to claim that our conjecture
reflects the assumed psychology of case-based reasoning, we must conclude that our
results provide weak evidence against CBDT.
However, we should point out that an experiment with some similarities to ours
has found evidence of a type of correlation neglect which, although not the type that
we tested for, is also consistent with CBDT. Charness and Levin (2005) report an
individual choice experiment in which there were two urns (“left” and “right”) from
which balls were drawn with replacement. Balls were either “white” (losing balls) or
“black” (winning balls). A prior random event, not revealed to subjects, determined
the distribution of balls in the two urns in such a way that a winning draw from one
urn increased the posterior probability of a winning draw from the other. (Compare
our positive correlation treatment.) In the context of CBDT, the most interesting of
Charness and Levin’s treatments were those in which subjects were required to play
one lottery on a specified urn and then, after the outcome of that lottery was revealed,
played a second lottery on whichever urn they chose. The parameters of the exper-
iment were fixed so that, if the first lottery was on the left urn, the Bayes-rational
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response was to stay with the left urn after a loss, but to shift to the right urn after a
win. In fact, subjects’ responses showed a strong tendency towards the opposite pat-
tern, as implied by the win-stay-lose-shift heuristic (Robbins 1952). This heuristic is
consistent with CBDT if the utility of a win is higher than the subject’s aspiration
level. 10 A significant difference between our experiment and Charness and Levin’s
is that in ours, subjects did not choose between “staying” and “shifting”; they saw
a fixed number of trials of each lottery and then reported a valuation for one of the
lotteries, which had been selected at random. Thus, our experiment tests for a pos-
sible effect of CBDT in a situation in which the win-stay-lose-shift heuristic is not
applicable.
Although our experiment finds no evidence of the specific form of correlation
neglect implied by our conjecture, it is clear our participants found it difficult to per-
form Bayesian reasoning about decisions that involved negative correlation. More
precisely, when reporting valuations of an offered lottery i, participants were gener-
ally able to recognise the irrelevance of outcomes of lotteries that were independent
of i, and to recognise the relevance of outcomes of lotteries that were positively
correlated with i; but they failed to recognise the relevance of negative correlation.
Surprisingly, however, their stated probability judgements about lottery i (expressed
in qualitative statements about the “chance” of winning) showed Bayesian responses
to independence, positive correlation, and negative correlation. Our post-hoc con-
jecture is that the problem was one of cognitive overload. Intuitively, negative
correlation is a more difficult concept than independence or positive correlation, and
working out one’s willingness to exchange a lottery for money is more difficult than
merely judging the chance of winning if one plays it. The combination of these two
sources of difficulty may have been too challenging for our participants.
This surprising finding raises doubts about the almost universal practice in experi-
mental economics of treating incentivised decision problems as the gold standard for
the elicitation of participants’ beliefs. If linking the elicitation of beliefs with prob-
lems of decision under uncertainty can lead to cognitive overload, experimentalists
need to consider the possibility that direct, nonincentivised questions about beliefs
might produce more accurate data.
Acknowledgments The authors thank an anonymous referee for constructive comments; Maria Bigoni,
Melanie Parravano, Axel Sonntag and Jiwei Zheng for z-Tree assistance; and Ailko van der Veen, Cameron
Belton, James Rossington, Mengjie Wang, and Lian Xue for helping conduct the experiment sessions. Sug-
den and Turocy acknowledge the support of the Network for Integrated Behavioural Science (Economic
and Social Research Council Grant ES/K002201/1). All errors are the responsibility of the authors.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 Interna-
tional License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution,
and reproduction in any medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the
source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license, and indicate if changes were made.
10Gilboa and Schmeidler (1995, p. 610) discuss a similar example.
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Appendix A: Determining winning numbers
Before each session of the positive correlation treatment, forty distinct “winning”
numbers were determined by draws (without replacement) from a bingo cage with
100 balls numbered from 1 to 100. The winning numbers were distributed between
two envelopes according to the order in which they had been drawn, thirty numbers
being put in one envelope and ten in the other. The envelopes were then sealed. This
process was fully explained to participants. At an appropriate stage in the reading
aloud of the experimental instructions, the two envelopes were shown to participants
and placed in a bag. A participant was asked to draw one envelope from the bag and to
mark it “blue and yellow”. While the experimenter continued to read the instructions,
an assistant entered the numbers in that envelope into the program for the experiment.
These became the winning numbers on both game boards.
Before each session of the negative correlation treatment, forty distinct winning
numbers were drawn in the same way as for the positive treatment; thirty were placed
in one envelope and ten in the other. The two envelopes were put in a bag. A par-
ticipant drew one envelope from the bag and marked it “blue”. The numbers in this
envelope became the winning numbers on the blue game board. She then drew the
second envelope and marked it “yellow”; the numbers in this envelope became the
winning numbers on the yellow game board.
Before each session of the independent treatment, forty distinct winning numbers
were drawn as for the other two treatments; thirty were placed in one envelope and
ten in the other. This pair of envelopes was assigned to the blue game board. All balls
were returned to the bingo cage and the process was repeated, resulting in a second
pair of envelopes, assigned to the yellow game board. A participant drew one of the
first pair of envelopes and marked it “blue”. The numbers in this envelope became the
winning numbers on the blue game board. She then drew one of the second pair of
envelopes and marked it “yellow”; the numbers in this envelope became the winning
numbers on the yellow game board.
In all treatments, after the winning numbers had been entered into the program, all
envelopes were posted on a wall. Participants were invited to inspect the contents of
the envelopes at the end of the session.
Appendix B: Bayesian posteriors
In calculating the posteriors, recall that the samples from the board are drawn without
replacement. Therefore, the distribution of hits is given by a suitable parameterisation
of the hypergeometric distribution.
In the independent treatment, let H denote the state in which board i is of the high
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In the positive treatment, let H denote the state in which both boards i and j are
of the high type, and L the state in which both are low. Conditional on state H , the
total number of hits hi + hj follow the hypergeometric distribution,









and conditional on state L, then hi + hj follows the hypergeometric distribution,









The calculation of probabilities for the negative treatment deserves more detailed
comment. Let H denote the state in which board i is high and board j is low, and L
denote the state in which board i is low and board j is high. Suppose that among the
five numbers selected as trials for board i there were hi winning numbers on board
i, and sj winning numbers on board j . Among the five numbers selected as trials for
board j , suppose there were hj winning numbers on board j , and si winning numbers
on board i. In our setup, participants do observe hi and hj , but do not observe si and
sj . Because in our design the winning numbers on the two boards were guaranteed
to be distinct, the random variables hi and hj are not independent conditional on H
or L.
The probability of having hi winning numbers on board i and sj winning numbers
on board j among the five numbers revealed for board i is given by the multivariate
hypergeometric distribution,











The probability of having hj winning numbers on board j and si winning numbers
on board i among the five numbers revealed for board i, conditional on the outcome
of the draws on board i, is also a multivariate hypergeometric distribution,











Therefore, the total probability in state H of seeing hi winning numbers among the
five draws on board i, and hj winning numbers among the five draws on board j , is
obtained by summing over the unobserved variables si and sj ,
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By symmetry, P(hi, hj |L) = P(hj , hi |H). Using these formulas it is straightfor-
ward to tabulate the posterior probabilities as given in Table 1.
The calculation above takes care to reflect the fact that the sets of winning numbers
on the two boards are disjoint. As an alternative simplifying assumption, one could
assume that hi and hj are independent conditional on the assignment of the board
types.11 Then, conditional on the board type, hi and hj would follow independent
hypergeometric distributions, and the posterior probabilities would be
ρi(hi, hj ) hj = 0 hj = 1 hj = 2 hj = 3
hi = 0 .500 .204 .058 .013
hi = 1 .796 .500 .193 .050
hi = 2 .942 .807 .500 .181
hi = 3 .987 .950 .820 .500
These differ only slightly from the results of the precise calculation given in
Table 1. The ranking of memories by posterior is not affected.
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